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Quantum Mechanics in a New Light
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
Abstract Although the present paper looks upon the formal apparatus of quan-
tum mechanics as a calculus of correlations, it goes beyond a purely operationalist
interpretation. Having established the consistency of the correlations with the
existence of their correlata (measurement outcomes), and having justified the dis-
tinction between a domain in which outcome-indicating events occur and a do-
main whose properties only exist if their existence is indicated by such events,
it explains the difference between the two domains as essentially the difference
between the manifested world and its manifestation. A single, intrinsically un-
differentiated Being manifests the macroworld by entering into reflexive spatial
relations. This atemporal process implies a new kind of causality and sheds new
light on the mysterious nonlocality of quantum mechanics. Unlike other realist in-
terpretations, which proceed from an evolving-states formulation, the present in-
terpretation proceeds from Feynman’s formulation of the theory, and it introduces
a new interpretive principle, replacing the collapse postulate and the eigenvalue–
eigenstate link of evolving-states formulations. Applied to alternatives involving
distinctions between regions of space, this principle implies that the spatiotem-
poral differentiation of the physical world is incomplete. Applied to alternatives
involving distinctions between things, it warrants the claim that, intrinsically, all
fundamental particles are identical in the strong sense of numerical identical. They
are the aforementioned intrinsically undifferentiated Being, which manifests the
macroworld by entering into reflexive spatial relations.
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1 Introduction
While the stunningly elegant formalism of quantum mechanics can be written
down on a napkin, attempts to make sense of it fill entire libraries (Schlosshauer,
2011, p. 19). Not a single reliable experiment or observation has ever been at odds
with what it predicts. Its ever-growing range of technological applications borders
on magic, yet no one seems to know how the magic works. Subatomic particles,
atoms, and molecules have ways of behaving available to them which seem to be
quite unlike what we know how to think about.
The difficulty is compounded by several factors. One of these factors is the way
in which quantum mechanics is routinely taught. While a junior-level classical me-
chanics course devotes a considerable amount of time to different formulations of
classical mechanics—such as Newtonian, Lagrangian, Hamiltonian, least action—
even graduate-level courses emphasize one particular formulation of quantum me-
chanics almost to the exclusion of all variants. There are at least nine formulations
of quantum mechanics (Styer et al., 2002), among them Heisenberg’s matrix for-
mulation, Schro¨dinger’s wave-function formulation, Feynman’s path-integral for-
mulation, Wigner’s phase-space formulation, and the density-matrix formulation.
It would seem reasonable to think that the interpretation of quantum mechanics
should be based on features that are common to all formulations of the theory,
not on the mathematical idiosyncracies of a particular formulation. This point
may be illustrated by an analogy with the inertial frames of the special theory of
relativity. If the same physical situation is described using different frames, certain
features (like the temporal order of events connected by light signals) are common
to all descriptions, while other features (like the temporal order of events that are
simultaneous in some frames) are not. Just as it is standard practice to consider
only those features objective that are shared by all relativistic descriptions of a
physical situation, so it should be standard practice to extract the physical import
of the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics from those features that
are common to all formulations of the theory. What is common to all formulations
is that they provide us with tools for calculating statistical correlations between
measurement outcomes, or with algorithms for assigning probabilities to possible
measurement outcomes on the basis of actual measurement outcomes.1
In The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics (Wallace,
2008), a distinction is drawn between the Bare Quantum Formalism, which is said
to precede any notion of probability and measurement, and the Quantum Algo-
rithm, which serves to extract the probabilities of measurement outcomes: “The
1 There is further evidence that quantum mechanics is essentially a probability calculus or
a calculus of correlations. If one accepts the existence of “ordinary” objects, defined as objects
that (i) have spatial extent (they “occupy” space), (ii) are composed of finite numbers of objects
that lack spatial extent, and (iii) neither collapse nor explode as soon as they are formed, then
one needs the uncertainty principle to stabilize these objects, and the “uncertainties” ∆x
and ∆p must be measures of an objective indeterminacy or fuzziness. This is because what
“fluffs out” ordinary objects cannot be anyone’s ignorance of the exact values of their internal
relative positions and momenta; it can only be an objective indeterminacy. We describe this
objective indeterminacy by assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of measurements. If
we then look for an appropriate probability calculus—for how the probabilities of the possible
outcomes of a measurement depend on actual outcomes, and how they depend on the time of
the measurement to the possible outcomes of which they are assigned—what we find is the
formal apparatus of quantum mechanics. This argument is set forth in (Mohrhoff, 2009b) and
in greater detail in (Mohrhoff, 2011, Chapter 8).
Quantum Mechanics in a New Light 3
Bare Quantum Formalism . . . is an elegant piece of mathematics; the Quantum
Algorithm is an ill-defined and unattractive mess.” This “ill-defined and unattrac-
tive mess” has come to be seen as “the great scandal of physics.” Otherwise it is
known as the Measurement Problem. What is perceived as particularly offensive
is the apparently inevitable invocation of primitives like “measurement” and “ob-
server,” which are beyond the scope of the Bare Quantum Formalism. But if it is
possible to derive the theory by an argument that is transcendental in the sense of
Kant, as a precondition of the possibility of ordinary objects (defined in note 1),
and if this condition of possibility turns out to be a probability calculus, then the
distinction between a Bare Quantum Formalism (which precedes the notions of
probability and measurement) and a Quantum Algorithm (which serves to extract
probabilities from the former) is misconceived. There is no formalism that precedes
the notions of probability and measurement. Every piece of the formalism can be
derived, and therefore can be understood, as an aspect of a probability calculus.2
The probabilities that quantum mechanics allows us to calculate have two ob-
vious and natural dependencies. They depend on the actual outcomes on the basis
of which they are assigned, and they depend on the times of the measurements to
the possible outcomes of which they are assigned. But since it is widely believed
(owing to how the theory is routinely taught) that the aim of interpreting quantum
mechanics is to make sense of Schro¨dinger’s wave-function formulation or Dirac’s
cognate state-vector formulation, the two dependencies are now almost univer-
sally understood as alternating ways in which quantum states evolve: between
measurements, a quantum state changes continuously and predictably, whereas at
the time of a measurement it changes (or appears to change) discontinuously and
unpredictably. This way of thinking engendered a more specific problem—the prob-
lem of objectification, whose first rigorous formulations are due to von Neumann
(1932) and Pauli (1933). Detailed recent discussions are (Busch et al., 1996) and
(Mittelstaedt, 1998).
Every discussion of this problem begins by describing the process of measure-
ment as comprising three stages: the system preparation, a continuous dynamical
process called “premeasurement” (pm), and the seemingly miraculous appearance
of an outcome called “objectification” (ob). In terms of projection-valuedmeasures:
∑
k
ck|A0〉|qk〉 (pm)−→
∑
k
ck|Ak〉|qk〉 (ob)−→ |A(q)〉|q〉. (1)
Every interpretation of quantum mechanics that attaches to a quantum state an
ontological significance which goes beyond that of a probability algorithm, founders
over the transition from the state that is supposed to complete the premeasure-
ment to the state that is supposed to complete the measurement, in which q
(one of the possible outcomes qk) is indicated. Mittelstaedt (1998, Sect. 4.3b) and
Busch et al. (1996, Sect. III.6.2) have even proved theorems to the effect that the
objectification problem is insoluble. The least that can be said is that such realist
interpretations raise issues that are far from being settled. From an operationalist
2 The notion that a Bare Quantum Formalism can be separated from the quantum-
mechanical probability calculus is also suggested by the manner in which the axioms of stan-
dard quantum mechanics are routinely stated. This is because the first several axioms tend
to be stated without explicit reference to probabilities; only the last couple of axioms refer
to probabilities. Yet every single axiom makes perfect sense only as a feature of a probability
calculus, as has been argued in (Mohrhoff, 2009b) and (Mohrhoff, 2011, Section 16.1).
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or antirealist point of view, this does not come as a surprise. For the wave func-
tion’s dependence on time is not the continuous time-dependence of an evolving
physical state. The time it depends on is the time of the measurement to the
possible outcomes of which it serves to assign probabilities. As Peres (1984) has
stressed, “there is no interpolating wave function giving the ‘state of the system’
between measurements”.3 Nothing good can come out of the transmogrification of
a probability algorithm into an evolving physical state.
During a successful measurement, the apparatus does indeed evolve from a
neutral state, in which it is ready to perform its function, to a state in which it
indicates an outcome, but this evolution does not involve the unitary “evolution”
of the quantum state of a composite quantum system into a superposition of the
form
∑
k
ck|ak〉|bk〉, where |ak〉 and |bk〉 are eigenstates of observables A and B.
This superposition “obtains” at a time t only in the conditional sense that a joint
measurement of A and B, made at the time t, would (or will) indicate the pair
of outcomes ak and bk with probability |ck|2, and that it would (or will) indicate
the pair of outcomes ai and bk with probability 0 if i 6= k. The strict correlation
between the possible outcomes of the two observables warrants another conditional
statement, to wit: if (say) a measurement of A yields ak, then a measurement of B
would (or will) yield bk with probability 1. What it does not warrant is the claim
that B then has the value bk. Probability 1 is not sufficient for “is” or “has”.
4
What the superposition
∑
k
ck|Ak〉|qk〉 actually tells us, therefore, is this: if
the apparatus were subjected to a measurement, and if the outcome were Ak,
a measurement of the system observable Q would yield qk with probability 1.
What is logically inconsistent, what is self-contradictory, is to read Ak here as
representing an outcome-indicating property. As a probability calculus, quantum
mechanics presupposes the events to which it serves to assign probabilities. It
presupposes the existence of outcome-indicating devices with outcome-indicating
properties. But no device can (i) be an outcome-indicating device and (ii) enter a
superposition involving outcome-indicating properties. No measurement apparatus
can (i) serve as a measurement apparatus and (ii) enter a state that disqualifies it
as a measurement apparatus—unless one embraces a many-worlds interpretation,
in which every outcome-indicating state is realized in a separate world.5
3 Here Peres echoes Bohr’s insistence that what happens between the preparation of a sys-
tem and a measurement is a holistic phenomenon, which cannot be decomposed into the
unitary evolution of a quantum state and a subsequent “collapse” of the same: “all unambigu-
ous interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism involves the fixation of the external
conditions, defining the initial state of the atomic system concerned and the character of the
possible predictions as regards subsequent observable properties of that system. Any measure-
ment in quantum theory can in fact only refer either to a fixation of the initial state or to the
test of such predictions, and it is first the combination of measurements of both kinds which
constitutes a well-defined phenomenon.” (Bohr, 1939)
4 Another misconception muddying the interpretive waters is the so-called eigenvalue-
eigenstate link, a postulate that Dirac (1958, pp. 46–47) formulated thus: “The expression
that an observable ‘has a particular value’ for a particular state is permissible . . . in the spe-
cial case when a measurement of the observable is certain to lead to the particular value, so
that the state is an eigenstate of the observable.” If the time a quantum state depends on is
the time of the measurement to the possible outcomes of which it serves to assign probabilities,
then the time at which an observable has a particular value can only be the time of an actual
measurement.
5 Many-worlds interpretations, like other realist interpretations, face a number of issues that
(to say the least) have by no means been conclusively resolved (Barrett, 1999; Marchildon,
2015).
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Because quantum mechanics presupposes the events to which it serves to as-
sign probabilities, it cannot be called upon to account for their existence. But of
course it has to be consistent with it. Any argument or way of thinking which
leads to the conclusion that the quantum-mechanical correlation laws are incon-
sistent with the existence of their correlata will of necessity depend on at least one
false assumption. Insofar as there is a measurement problem, it can be described
as the task of demonstrating the theory’s semantic consistency—or else the task
of identifying the false assumption(s) underlying the theory’s perceived lack of
semantic consistency. The term “semantic consistency” was introduced by von
Weizsa¨cker. By the semantic consistency of a theory he meant “that its precon-
ceptions, how we interpret the mathematical structure physically, will themselves
obey the laws of the theory” (Von Weizsa¨cker, 2006, p. 260). Among the obvious
preconceptions of quantum mechanics are the existence of outcome-indicating de-
vices having outcome-indicating properties and being able to evolve from a neutral
state to an outcome-indicating state. Section 2 takes up the task of demonstrating
that these preconceptions of the theory do indeed obey the laws of the theory.
In particular, it will be shown how macroscopic objects and outcome-indicating
properties can and should be defined so that the evolution of measurement devices
from neutral states to outcome-indicating states is consistent with the unitary de-
pendence of probabilities on the time of the measurement to the possible outcomes
of which they are assigned.
The demonstration of quantum theory’s semantic consistency proceeds in two
steps. First it is shown that the spatial differentiation of the physical world does
not go “all the way down”: if conceptually we keep partitioning space into smaller
and smaller regions, we reach a point beyond which the distinctions we make
between regions no longer correspond to anything in the actual physical world.
Subsequently it is shown that the incompleteness of the spatial differentiation of
the physical world implies the existence of a non-empty class of objects whose
positions are “smeared out” only relative to an imaginary spatiotemporal back-
ground that is more differentiated than the physical world. This paves the way
for rigorous definitions of “macroscopic object” and “outcome-indicating event”
in the theory’s own terms.
Despite its insistence on the characterization of quantum mechanics as a prob-
ability calculus, the present paper aims to provide a coherent picture of reality. A
realist interpretation of the theory does not have to be a realist interpretation of
a universal state vector or wave function. The reason why a coherent picture of
reality has not yet been found may well be that the realist interpretations on offer
treat quantum states as evolving physical states. At any rate, if the aim is to arrive
at a coherent picture of reality, evolving-states formulations of the theory cannot
be relied on. Section 3 makes use of Feynman’s formulation (Feynman et al., 2005)
to introduce an interpretive principle that takes the place of the collapse (or pro-
jection) postulate of the former formulations. Instead of attempting to account for
the objectification of the values of measured observables, this interpretive principle
specifies the conditions under which distinctions that we tend to make can not be
objectified (i.e., can not be represented as real differences in the actual physical
world).
In Section 4 this interpretive principle is applied to two paradigmatic setups,
one concerning distinctions between regions of space, the other concerning distinc-
tions between things. The first application confirms the conclusion, reached in Sec-
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tion 2, that space cannot be an intrinsically differentiated expanse. The so-called
parts of space need to be physically realized by detectors. The second application
is exemplified by a scattering experiment. Two identical particles—particles lack-
ing individualizing properties—are initially found to be moving northward and
southward, respectively. The next thing we know is that the same two particles
are found to be moving eastward and westward, respectively. The question then is:
which incoming particle is identical with which outgoing particle? It is well known
that there is no answer to this question. The distinction we make between the
two possible identifications cannot be objectified. What does this tell us about the
physical world? The proposed answer is simple, straightforward, but also highly
counterintuitive. It is that the incoming particles (and therefore the outgoing ones
as well) are one and the same entity. What’s more, there is no compelling reason
to believe that this identity ceases when it ceases to have observable consequences
owing to the presence of individuating properties. We are free to take the view
that intrinsically each particle is numerically identical with every other particle.
What presents itself here and now with these properties and what presents itself
there and then with those properties is one and the same entity, to which I shall
refer as “Being.”
Another reason we find it so hard to make sense of the quantum theory is that
it answers a question we are not in the habit of asking. Instead of asking what the
ultimate constituents of matter are and how they interact and combine, we should
ask: how are forms manifested? To this question, too, a simple, straightforward,
and counterintuitive answer can be given: the shapes of things resolve themselves
into reflexive spatial relations—that is, self -relations, relations between Being and
the self-same Being. By entertaining reflexive spatial relations, Being supports
(i) what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations
is ignored, and (ii) what looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of
the relations is reified. These ideas, put forth in Section 5, pave the way for a
deeper understanding of the nature of the quantum domain and its relation to
the “classical” or macroscopic domain, beyond the linguistic necessity of speaking
about the quantum domain in terms of correlations between macroscopic events,
which was stressed by Bohr (1934). The distinction between the two domains now
presents itself as essentially a distinction between the manifested world and its
manifestation.
The penultimate section addresses the mysterious nonlocality of quantum me-
chanics. The manifestation of the spatiotemporal world—the atemporal process by
which Being enters into reflexive relations and matter and space come into being
as a result—is the nonlocal event par excellence. It is the root of all quantum cor-
relations, not only the seemingly inexplicable ones between simultaneous events
in different locations but also the seemingly explicable ones between successive
events in the same location. This section concludes with a provocative thought.
What if the force at work in the physical world—the dynamism by which Being
manifests the physical world—were an infinite (unlimited) force operating under
self-imposed constraints? In that case we would have no reason to be surprised or
dismayed by the impossibility of explaining the quantum-mechanical correlation
laws in terms of physical mechanisms, inasmuch as it would be self-contradictory
to invoke a physical mechanism to explain the working of an infinite force. What
would need explaining is why this force works under the particular constraints
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that it does. That, of course, is a question for pure metaphysics.6 The final sec-
tion, prompted by comments by a reviewer, briefly addresses the relation between
quantum mechanics and consciousness.
2 Semantic consistency—the macroworld
While quantum mechanics can tell us that the probability of finding a particle
in a given region of space is 1, it is incapable of giving us a region of space. For
this a detector is needed. A detector is needed not only to indicate the presence
of a particle in a region but also—and in the first place—to physically realize a
region, so as to make it possible to attribute to a particle the property of being
inside. Speaking more generally, a macroscopic apparatus is needed not only to
indicate the possession of a property by a quantum system but also—and in the
first place—to make a set of properties available for attribution to the system.
In addition, a macroscopic clock is needed to realize attributable times. This, of
course, is vintage Bohr, who insisted that the “procedure of measurement has an
essential influence on the conditions on which the very definition of the physical
quantities in question rests” (Bohr, 1935).
But if detectors are needed to realize regions of space, space cannot be intrin-
sically partitioned. If we conceive of it as partitioned, we can do so only as far
as regions of space can be realized—i.e., to the extent that the requisite detec-
tors are physically possible. This extent is limited by the indeterminacy principle,
inasmuch as this rules out the existence of detectors with arbitrarily small sen-
sitive regions that are (and remain) sharply localized relative to each other. If
such regions cannot be realized (as the sensitive regions of detectors), then they
are not available for attribution (as positions). Hence, if conceptually we keep
partitioning space into smaller and smaller regions, we will reach a point beyond
which the distinctions we make between regions no longer correspond to anything
in the actual physical world. We can conceive of a partition of the physical world
into finite regions so small that none of them can be attributed (as a position)
because none of them is available for attribution. In other words, physical space
cannot be realistically modeled as an actually existing manifold of intrinsically
distinct points. In yet other words, the spatial differentiation of the physical world
is incomplete—it does not go “all the way down.”
The same goes for the world’s temporal differentiation, and this not only be-
cause of the relativistic interdependence of distances and durations. Just as the
properties of quantum systems or the values of quantum observables need to be
realized—made available for attribution—by macroscopic devices, so the times at
which properties or values are possessed need to be realized by macroscopic clocks.
And just as it is impossible for macroscopic devices to realize sharp positions, so
it is impossible for macroscopic clocks to realize sharp times (Hilgevoord, 1998).
6 If the existence of “ordinary” objects (as defined in note 1) is a fact, then a teleological or
anthropic demonstration of what is entailed by it can go a long way towards explaining why
the laws of physics have the form that they do (Mohrhoff, 2002, 2009b, 2011). The question
for pure metaphysics is then why “ordinary” objects, which have spatial extent, are composed
of finite numbers of objects lacking spatial extent. For a possible answer see the final section
and (Mohrhoff, 2014a).
8 Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
Hence, neither the spatial nor the temporal differentiation of the physical world
goes “all the way down.”
In a world that is incompletely differentiated spacewise, the next best thing
to a sharp trajectory is a trajectory that is so sharp that the bundle of sharp
trajectories over which it is statistically distributed is never probed. In other words,
the next best thing to an object with a sharp position is an object whose position
probability distribution is and remains so narrow that there are no detectors with
narrower position probability distributions—detectors that could probe the region
over which the object’s position extends. If the spatiotemporal differentiation of
the physical world does not go “all the way down,” such objects must exist. If I call
them “macroscopic objects,” and if I call their positions “macroscopic positions,”
it is not intended to mean that they are so large and/or massive as to behave like
classical objects FAPP (for all practical purposes), but in the more rigorous sense
just spelled out. By the “macroworld” I shall mean the totality of macroscopic
positions.
What can be deduced from this characterization of macroscopic positions is
that the events by which their values are indicated are (diachronically) correlated
in ways that are consistent with the laws of motion that quantum mechanics
yields in the classical limit. For any given time t the following holds: if every event
that indicates a macroscopic position prior to the time t were taken into account,
then—given the necessarily finite accuracy of position-indicating events—every
event that indicates a macroscopic position at a later time would be consistent
with all earlier position-indicating events and the classical laws of motion. There
is, however, one necessary exception: in order to permit a macroscopic object—
the proverbial pointer—to indicate the value of an observable, its position must
be allowed to change unpredictably if and when it serves to indicate an outcome.
Macroscopic objects thus follow trajectories that are only counterfactually in-
definite. Their positions are “smeared out” only in relation to an imaginary spa-
tiotemporal background that is more differentiated than the physical world. No
value-indicating event reveals the indefiniteness of a macroscopic position (in the
only way it could, through a departure from what the classical laws predict). The
testable correlations between outcomes of measurements of macroscopic positions
are therefore consistent with both the classical and the quantum laws.7 That makes
it possible to attribute to macroscopic positions a measurement-independent real-
ity, and this makes it possible for macroscopic positions to define the obtainable
values of observables and to indicate the outcomes of measurements.8
According to a theorem due to Clifton and Halvorson (2002), relativistic quan-
tum theory engenders a fundamental conflict between causality and localizability,
so that particle talk is “strictly fictional”:
The argument for localizable particles appears to be very simple: Our expe-
rience shows us that objects (particles) occupy finite regions of space. But
the reply to this argument is just as simple: These experiences are illusory!
Although no object is strictly localized in a bounded region of space, an
7 If the indicated values of a supposedly macroscopic position turned out to be inconsistent
with a classical law of motion, then this particular position would not actually be a macroscopic
position.
8 For extended versions of the present line of reasoning see (Mohrhoff, 2009a, 2014).
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object can be well-enough localized to give the appearance to us (finite
observers) that it is strictly localized.
What Clifton and Halvorson have established is in some respects analogous to
the non-objectification theorems proved by Mittelstaedt (1998, Sect. 4.3(b)) and
the insolubility theorem for the objectification problem due to Busch et al. (1996,
Sect. III.6.2). While (according to these theorems) non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics cannot account for the measurement outcomes which it presupposes and
serves to correlate, relativistic quantum mechanics cannot account for the particle
detections which it presupposes and serves to correlate. The latter provides us with
conditional statements of the following form: if a set of particles Pi with momenta
pi come together in a scattering event, then such is the probability with which
a set of particles Qk with momenta qk will emerge from the event. The theory
requires that in-states be prepared and out-states be observed, but it leaves the
operational implementation to the experimenters. Experimenters use a generalized
version of Bohr’s correspondence principle to identify these states with the particle
types and momenta they obtain by analyzing particle tracks, and it is these data
that the theory serves to correlate.9
Whether or not particles are localizable depends on our answer to the ques-
tion: localizable relative to what? How are the positions of particles defined—the
observable positions, the positions that we can meaningfully attribute to parti-
cles? The most basic axiom of field theory—so basic that it is rarely explicitly
stated—postulates the existence of a spatiotemporal manifold M. What Clifton
and Halvorson have shown is that a particle cannot be in a state in which the
probability of finding it within any finite spatial region of M equals 1. M, how-
ever, is not where experiments are performed. The possible outcomes of position
measurements are not defined relative to a completely differentiated spatial back-
ground such as M. Attributable positions are defined by the sensitive regions of
real-world detectors, which also cannot be localized in any finite spatial region of
M. What is strictly fictional, therefore, is the spacetime manifold postulated by
quantum field theory. What Clifton and Halvorson have shown is not that there
are no localizable particles but that this manifold is not localizable relative to the
positions that can be meaningfully attributed to particles.
As long as one takes detection events to be localized relative toM, arguments
based on the quantum-mechanical probability calculus can establish the theory’s
semantic consistency only FAPP (for all practical purposes). This applies in par-
ticular to the most vigorously pursued strategy for demonstrating the consistency
of the quantum correlations with the existence of their correlata, which capitalizes
on the phenomenon of environment-induced decoherence (Joos et al., 2003; Zurek,
9 According to Falkenburg (2007, p. XII), “quantum mechanics and quantum field theory
only refer to individual systems due to the ways in which the quantum models of matter and
subatomic interactions are linked by semi-classical models to the classical models of subatomic
structure and scattering processes. All these links are based on tacit use of a generalized
correspondence principle in Bohr’s sense (plus other unifying principles of physics).” This
generalized correspondence principle, due to Heisenberg (1930), serves as “a semantic principle
of continuity which guarantees that the predicates for physical properties such as ‘position’,
‘momentum’, ‘mass’, ‘energy’, etc., can also be defined in the domain of quantum mechanics,
and that one may interpret them operationally in accordance with classical measurement
methods. It provides a great many inter-theoretical relations, by means of which the formal
concepts and models of quantum mechanics can be filled with physical meaning” (Falkenburg,
2007, p. 191).
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2003; Schlosshauer, 2007). If detection events are localized relative to real-world
detectors, on the other hand, decoherence arguments contribute to showing that
macroscopic objects (as previously defined) exist (and this not just FAPP), by
making the existence of such objects overwhelmingly likely.
If quantum states—probability algorithms such as state vectors and wave
functions—are mistaken for evolving physical states, and if their dependence on
the time of a measurement is mistaken for a natural process that governs the evo-
lution of these physical states, then collapse and objectification, which seem to
be required to conclude the measurement process, become preternatural indeed.
It therefore does not come as a surprise that von Neumann (1932) himself, the
first to codify the tripartite measurement scheme (system preparation—unitary
premeasurement—objectification), was led to conclude that the final termination
of a measurement is in the conscious observer. The interpretation presented here
has no need to invoke conscious observers, not even in the manner of many-worlds
interpretations, which multiply the number of conscious observers in the Universe
by the number of possible outcomes each time a measurement is made. Because
macroscopic positions possess a measurement-independent reality, which allows
them to define the values of observables and to indicate the outcomes of measure-
ments, quantum mechanics does not require reference to conscious observers any
more than classical mechanics does. What quantum mechanics cannot dispense
with is reference to measurements (outcome-indicating events).
3 A new interpretive principle
It is customary to distinguish between interpretations of quantum mechanics that
aim to present a coherent picture of reality, and anti-realist (or empiricist, or op-
erationalist) interpretations, which look upon the theory’s formal apparatus as a
tool for making predictions. It is rarely (if ever) appreciated that these alternatives
are not exclusive. There are other ways of presenting a coherent picture of reality
than to invest with physical reality a mathematical feature of a particular formu-
lation of quantum mechanics such as the wave function. There may be a coherent
picture of reality that explains why the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics
is essentially a probability calculus, and why quantum states cannot be regarded
as evolving physical states. It may well be because the realist interpretations on
offer—the leading contenders being many-worlds (Barrett, 1999; Saunders et al.,
2010), the de Broglie-Bohm theory (Bohm, 1952), and dynamical collapse theories
(Ghirardi et al., 1986; Pearle, 1989)—treat quantum states as evolving physical
states, that a coherent picture of reality has not yet been found.
The present paper aims to present such a picture. To this end, the most useful
formulation of quantum mechanics is Feynman’s (Feynman et al., 2005), not least
because all it essentially does is to assign probability amplitudes to alternatives,
which are defined as sequences of measurement outcomes, or as the continuum
limits of such sequences.
Both the wave-function formulation and Feynman’s feature a pair of dynamical
principles. In the former they are unitary evolution and collapse/objectification,
in the latter they are summation over amplitudes (followed by taking the absolute
square of the sum) and summation over probabilities (preceded by taking the ab-
solute square of each amplitude). In the context of the wave-function formulation,
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unitary evolution seems natural; what calls for explanation is collapse (the projec-
tion postulate) and objectification (postulated via the eigenvalue–eigenstate link).
In the context of Feynman’s formulation, adding probabilities seems natural since
this conforms to classical probability theory; what calls for explanation is why
we have to add amplitudes. What is at issue, therefore, is not what causes wave
functions to collapse and outcomes to exist but why we have to add amplitudes
whenever quantum mechanics requires us to do so. To answer this question, the
following interpretive principle has been proposed (Mohrhoff, 2014).
(I) Whenever quantum mechanics requires us to add amplitudes, the distinctions
we make between the alternatives correspond to nothing in the physical world.
This is a statement about the structure or constitution of the physical world, not
a statement merely of our practical or conceptual limitations.
While the wave-function formulation stumps us with the dual problem of col-
lapse and objectification, Feynman’s formulation presents us with a question to
which there is a clear answer. The reason why quantum mechanics requires us to
add amplitudes is that the distinctions we make between the alternatives cannot
be objectified (represented as real). The issue is not how measurement outcomes
become objective but why distinctions we tend to make cannot be considered
objective.
4 Identical particles
Armed with a new interpretive principle, we set out to apply it to two paradigmatic
setups, one concerning distinctions between regions of space, the other concerning
distinctions between things. Applied to a two-slit experiment (or any two-way
interferometer experiment, for that matter), (I) tells us that the distinction we
make between pL = “the particle went through the left slit (L)” and pR = “the
particle went through the right slit (R)” corresponds to nothing in the physical
world. If this distinction could be objectified, the particle would take either L or
R, in which case the interference fringes predicted whenever we are required to
add amplitudes would not be seen. In some sense the particle took both slits, but
not in the sense of the conjunction pL ∧ pR, for one never sees that a particle
emerges from the left slit and from the right slit. To say that the particle went
through both slits can only mean that it went through the union L∪R of the two
slits without going through a particular slit and without being divided into parts
that go through different slits.10 This confirms our earlier conclusion that physical
space cannot be an intrinsically differentiated expanse, for if the parts of space
defined by the slit were intrinsically distinct, a particle could not go through both
slits in the sense just spelled out.11
The consistency of interpretive principle (I) might be challenged. If the dis-
tinctions we make between alternatives do not correspond to objective differences
in the physical world, how is it nevertheless possible for us to make these distinc-
tions? The two-slit experiment should make this clear. There are two alternatives:
the particle could go through L or it could go through R. The possibility of making
10 Because we are here concerned with the particle’s position, the question of parts does not
arise, for a position isn’t a thing that can have parts. It can only be indefinite or fuzzy.
11 For a significantly more detailed presentation of this argument see (Mohrhoff, 2014, Sec. 4).
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this distinction does not depend on whether a measurement determining the slit
taken by the particle is actually made. But only if this measurement is made can
the distinction between pL and pR be objectified.
Applied to the propagation of a pair of identical particles (i.e., particles of the
same type, lacking individualizing characteristics), (I) tells us that the distinction
we make between alternative identifications corresponds to nothing in the physical
world. The elastic scattering of two identical particles may serve as an example. (A
scattering process is called “elastic” if no particles are created or annihilated in the
process.) Given two identical particles initially moving northward and southward,
respectively, the probability of eventually finding one particle moving eastward
and one particle moving westward takes the form
∣∣〈EW |NS〉 ± 〈WE|NS〉
∣∣2, (2)
where the sign depends on whether the particles are bosons or fermions. This
expression can also be obtained by using the Born rule with the following initial
and final states:
|ψi〉 = 1√
2
(|NS〉 ± |SN〉), |ψf 〉 = 1√
2
(|EW 〉 ± |WE〉). (3)
It is then readily seen why any evolving-states formulation of quantum mechanics
requires the use of (anti)symmetrized particle states. If we were to use |AB〉 instead
of the (anti)symmetrized product, we would introduce, in addition to the physically
warranted distinction between “the particle in A” and “the particle in B,” the
physically unwarranted distinction between the “first” or “left” particle and the
“second” or “right” particle (in the expression |AB〉). This would be justified if
the particles carried “identity tags” corresponding to “left” and “right,” in which
case we would be required to add probabilities, not amplitudes. If the distinction
between “the particle inA” and “the particle in B” is the only physically warranted
distinction, the distinction between the “left” particle and the “right” particle must
be eliminated, and this is achieved by (anti)symmetrization.
Because in (2) amplitudes are added rather than probabilities, (I) applies, and
it tells us that the distinction we make between the alternative identifications
N = E,S =W or N = W,S = E
corresponds to nothing in the physical world. There is no answer to the question:
“Which outgoing particle is identical with which incoming particle?” What does
this tell us about the physical world? The answer I propose is simple, straight-
forward, but also highly counterintuitive. It is that the incoming particles (and
therefore the outgoing ones as well) are one and the same entity. The reason this
answer is counterintuitive is that we tend to think of distinct parts of space as
self-existent (rather than as being distinct only by virtue of being separately re-
alized by different detectors), and that we tend to think of whatever is contained
in distinct parts of space as separately and independently existing things. Apart
from “our habit of inappropriately reifying our successful abstractions” (Mermin,
2009), this unexamined way of thinking about space and things appears to me to
be one of the greatest obstacles to unraveling the magic and mystery of quantum
mechanics.
Initially we observe two distinct properties, the property of moving northward
and the property of moving southward, and subsequently we again observe two
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distinct properties, the property of moving eastward and the property of mov-
ing westward. We do not really observe two distinct things with two distinct
properties—this is one “two” too many. What we observe is perfectly consistent
with saying that, both initially and subsequently, we observe the same thing twice,
with two distinct properties. Here as elsewhere, unanswerable questions tend to
arise from false assumptions. The reason why “Which outgoing particle is identi-
cal with which incoming particle?” is unanswerable may well be that the question
implicitly assumes, wrongly, that, initially as well as subsequently, there are two
things.
But are there things over and above the initially and subsequently observed
properties? In other words, are there things over and above measurement out-
comes and their correlations? Are there particles? In order to throw light on these
questions, let us consider a series of position measurements, and let us assume that
each measurement yields exactly one outcome (i.e., each time exactly one detector
clicks). What we then have, in addition to detector clicks and correlations between
detector clicks, is evidence of a conservation law. If each time exactly two detec-
tors click, we have evidence of the same conservation law, the conserved quantity
being the number of simultaneous clicks (or the maximum number if the less than
perfect efficiency of real-world detectors is taken into account). If this is the only
conservation law in force (i.e., if the particles do not carry “identity tags”), can we
think of the system under study as being “made of” a fixed number of particles?
The answer is No, for we cannot then think of these particles as re-identifiable
individuals. In the quantum domain, individual identity is predicated on the exis-
tence of individualizing properties (“identity tags”), not on the distinguishability
of things per se—things considered in the absence of properties by which they can
be distinguished. Considered in the absence of properties by which things can be
distinguished, there is only one thing—the system as a whole.12
In the relativistic theory, the number of simultaneous detector clicks becomes
another quantum observable, which can come out different every time it is mea-
sured. Regardless of whether this number is fixed or variable, however, the in-
distinguishability of identical particles implies a unity of the system as a whole
that goes beyond the unity of “a Many that allows itself to be thought of as a
One” (Cantor’s definition of a set). Instead, we are in the presence of a One that
allows itself to be thought of as a Many—a “thing per se” that takes on a fixed or
variable number of positions each time its positions are measured. In our elastic
scattering example, the two particles are a One that manifests itself twice. The
incoming particles (and therefore the outgoing ones as well) are one and the same
entity. What’s more, there is no compelling reason to believe that this identity
ceases when it ceases to have observable consequences owing to the presence of
individuating properties. We are free to take the view that intrinsically each par-
ticle is numerically identical with every other particle. What presents itself here
and now with these properties and what presents itself there and then with those
12 There is a philosophical position according to which there are no things—there are only
bundles of properties. Whenever we apply quantum mechanics to a physical system, there is,
however, always one thing: the physical system as a whole. We may not be able to think of
it as being “made up” of “smaller” things, but we are always in a position to think of it as
the thing we study experimentally, and we are always able to attribute to it the properties we
observe.
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properties is one and the same entity.13 In what follows I shall call it “Being.” If
you prefer any other name, be my guest.14
5 Manifestation
Another reason it is so hard to make sense of the quantum theory is that it
answers a question we are not in the habit of asking. Instead of asking what the
ultimate constituents of matter are and how they interact and combine, we need to
broaden our repertoire of explanatory concepts and ask: how are forms manifested?
This question, too, has a simple, straightforward, and counterintuitive answer
(Mohrhoff, 2014, Sec. 9): The shapes of things resolve themselves into reflexive
spatial relations. By this I mean self-relations—relations between Being and the
self-same Being, relations between numerically identical relata. By entering into
(or by entertaining) reflexive spatial relations, Being gives rise to (or supports)
1. what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations
is ignored, and
2. what looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is
reified.
Because the relations are reflexive, the multiplicity of the relata is apparent rather
than real.15 And because physical space, insofar as it consists of anything, consists
of spatial relations, the spatial quality belongs to the relations themselves; they do
not owe it to a substantial expanse. But if physical space is the set of all reflexive
relations, the shapes of things are subsets of this set; they are particular sets of
spatial relations.
The view put forward here goes farther in relationism—the doctrine that space
and time are a family of spatial and temporal relations holding among the mate-
rial constituents of the universe—in that it also affirms that the ultimate material
constituents are formless. While fundamental particles are routinely described as
pointlike, what is meant is that they lack internal structure. Lack of internal struc-
ture is suggested by the scale-invariance of a particle’s effective cross-section(s) in
scattering experiments with probe particles that are themselves pointlike in this
sense, but can be verified only down to the de Broglie wavelength of the probe
particles. There can therefore be no evidence of absence of internal structure, let
alone evidence of a literally pointlike form. For further reasons why fundamen-
tal particles ought to be conceived as formless, see (Mohrhoff, 2014, Sect. 9). So
13 I am not the first to put forth this preposterous idea. In his Nobel Lecture on December
11, 1965, Feynman recalled: “I received a telephone call one day at the graduate college at
Princeton from Professor Wheeler, in which he said, ‘Feynman, I know why all electrons have
the same charge and the same mass.’ ‘Why?’ ‘Because, they are all the same electron!’ ”
14 There is an extensive literature on the subject of individuality in quantum theory. See
French (2011) for an overview and French and Krause (2006) for a comprehensive review.
French sums up the situation by stating that quantum mechanics is “compatible with two
distinct metaphysical ‘packages,’ one in which the particles are regarded as individuals and
one in which they are not.” I rather agree with Esfeld (2013), who does not consider it “a
serious option to regard quantum objects as possessing a primitive thisness (haecceity) so that
permuting these objects amounts to a real difference.”
15 Does this mean that the material world is unreal, as some illusionistic philosophies assert?
By no means, for the material world owes its existence to an intrinsically undifferentiated Being
and a multitude of reflexive relations, and these are real.
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conceived, the shapes of things resolve themselves into sets of spatial relations be-
tween formless and numerically identical relata. The truism that the universe lacks
a position because it lacks external spatial relations thus has a fitting complement:
a fundamental particle lacks a form because it lacks internal spatial relations.
Since it is necessary to distinguish between (i) properties that only exist if and
when they are measured and (ii) measurement-independent properties that are
capable of indicating outcomes, the distinction between a classical or macroscopic
domain and a non-classical or quantum domain is amply justified. But how can we
understand the relation between the two domains, beyond the linguistic necessity
of speaking about the quantum domain in terms of correlations between macro-
scopic events, which was stressed by Bohr (1934)? The answer I propose is that
the distinction between the two domains is essentially a distinction between the
manifested world and its manifestation.
Atoms and subatomic particles must in some way be responsible for the exis-
tence of the objects that populate the familiar world of everyday experience. But
since the kinematical properties of microphysical objects—their positions, mo-
menta, energies, etc.—only exist if and when they are indicated by the behavior
of macroscopic objects, they cannot play the role of interacting constituent parts.
Macroscopic objects cannot be said to be made of microphysical ones.16 A broader
concept is needed to understand the relation between the two domains, such as the
concept of manifestation. How, then, is this concept to be understood? To begin
with, since the manifestation of the world includes the manifestation of both space
and time, it cannot be conceived as a process that takes place in space and time.
We keep looking for the origin of the universe at the beginning of time, but this
is an error of perspective. I propose to identify the origin of the universe with the
Being that was introduced in the previous section, a Being intrinsically undiffer-
entiated, transcendent of spatial and temporal distinctions. And I propose to look
upon the manifestation of the world as a transition from the undifferentiated state
of Being to a state that allows itself to be described in the classical language of
interacting objects and causally related events—a transition from absolute unity
to the multiplicity of the macroworld. If there is a metaphysical message that
quantum mechanics is trying to convey to us, it concerns, I maintain, this tran-
sition. The theory thereby reverses the explanatory arrow of common sense and
folk physics (a.k.a. classical physics): instead of attempting to explain wholes in
terms of interacting parts, it suggests how the multiplicity of the world emerges
from an intrinsically undifferentiated Being.
The transition from the absolute unity of Being to the multiplicity of the
macroworld passes through several stages. Across these stages, the world’s dif-
ferentiation into distinguishable regions of space and distinguishable objects with
definite properties is gradually realized. There is a stage at which Being presents
itself as a multitude of formless particles. This stage is probed by high-energy
physics and known to us through correlations between the counterfactual clicks of
imagined detectors, i.e., in terms of transition probabilities between in-states and
out-states. There are stages that mark the emergence of form, albeit a type of form
that cannot yet be visualized. The forms of nucleons, nuclei, and atoms can only
16 When physicists reflect on the motives for their research, they nonetheless often claim
(especially on TV, in press releases, and in grant applications) that their aim is to discover
the elementary building blocks of the universe and the processes by which these interact with
each other—a rather schizoid state of affairs.
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be mathematically described, as probability distributions over abstract spaces of
increasingly higher dimensions. At energies low enough for atoms to be stable, it
becomes possible to conceive of objects with fixed numbers of components, and
these we describe in terms of correlations between the possible outcomes of unper-
formed measurements. The next stage—closest to the manifested world—contains
the first objects with forms that can be visualized—the atomic configurations of
molecules. But it is only the final stage—the manifested macroscopic world—that
contains the actual detector clicks and the actual measurement outcomes that have
made it possible to discover and study the correlations that govern the quantum
domain.
A further question presses itself upon us. Since most measurable quantities
only exist, or only have values, if and when they are measured, we cannot account
for the properties of macroscopic objects in terms of the properties of microphys-
ical objects. How, then, can atoms and subatomic particles be instrumental in
the manifestation of the macroworld? How can this manifestation be understood
without reference to the possessed properties of microphysical objects? The answer
is that atoms are known to us through correlations between measurement out-
comes,17 while subatomic particles are known to us through correlations between
detector clicks. Their respective roles in the manifestation of macroscopic objects
can be described in terms of conditional propositions expressing correlations, and
thus without referring to actually measured (and thus actually possessed) proper-
ties.
Many of the mysteries surrounding quantum mechanics become clear in this
light. Why, after all, is the general theoretical framework of contemporary physics
a probability calculus, and why are the probabilities assigned to measurement
outcomes? If quantum mechanics concerns a transition through which the differ-
entiation of the world into distinguishable objects and distinguishable regions of
space is gradually realized, the question arises as to how the intermediate stages
are to be described—the stages at which the differentiation is incomplete and the
distinguishability between objects or regions of space is only partially realized.
The answer to this question is that whatever is not completely distinguishable can
only be described by assigning probabilities to what is completely distinguishable,
namely to the different possible outcomes of a measurement. What is instrumental
in the manifestation of the world can only be described in terms of what happens in
the manifested world, or else in terms of correlations between events that happen
or could happen in the manifested world.
It is also worth stressing that the indeterminism of quantum mechanics does
not fundamentally consist in the existence of unpredictable changes disrupting a
predictable evolution, as the myth of evolving quantum states suggests. Instead,
it is rooted in the respective indeterminacies of the various stages of manifesta-
tion. The unpredictability of measurement outcomes is merely the consequence of
underlying indeterminacies, which evince themselves through unpredictable tran-
17 Generations of students have been puzzled by the special role that the z axis plays in
descriptions of the stationary states of atomic hydrogen. If a stationary state were to describe
an atom as it is by itself, the question would have no answer. A stationary state, however,
is a probability algorithm predicated on a particular preparation. In describing the atom’s
stationary states we assume that a particular component of its angular momentum has been
measured, along with its energy and its total angular momentum.
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sitions in the values of outcome-indicating positions (the proverbial “measurement
pointers”).
Quantum mechanics thus presents us with a so far unrecognized kind of cau-
sality—unrecognized, I believe, within the scientific literature albeit well-known
to metaphysics, inasmuch as the general philosophical pattern of a single world-
essence (“Being”) manifesting itself as a multiplicity of individual things is found
throughout the world.18 For the causality of the process of manifestation must be
distinguished from its more familiar temporal cousin, which links states or events
across time or spacetime. The usefulness of the latter is confined to the world
drama; it plays no part in setting the stage for it. It helps us make sense of the
manifested world as well as of the cognate world of classical physics, but it throws
no light on the process of manifestation nor on the quantum correlations that are
instrumental in the process.
While an atemporal causality does not involve a temporal sequence, process,
or transition, there are stages by which the differentiation of the world into distin-
guishable objects and distinguishable regions is gradually realized. The coexistent
stages of this gradual realization can be placed along a dimension of logical space
that is neither temporal nor spatial, and they can be viewed in a logical sequence,
as a transition from undifferentiated unity to the multiplicity of the manifested
world, via numerically identical particles, non-visualizable atoms, and partly visu-
alizable molecules. We do, in fact, take much the same liberty when we conceive,
as we routinely do, of temporal succession as if it were another spatial dimension.
If we have the right to visualize time as a dimension of a 4-dimensional expanse,
then we also have the right to imagine an atemporal causal arrow and to attribute
the existence of the world to an atemporal process of manifestation.
It may be of interest to compare the manifestation of the macroworld with the
traditional philosophical concept of the emergence of the Many from a One. In clas-
sical metaphysics, this emergence was conceived as running parallel to predication:
an immaterial essence or predicable universal becomes instantiated as an impred-
icable material individual. This instantiation, moreover, used to be conceived in
the framework of Platonic–Aristotelian dualism, which postulates an instantiating
medium (matter and/or space) in or by which the essences or universals get in-
stantiated. The manifestation of the macroworld, by contrast, requires no separate
medium and implies no dualism. All that is required is the realization of spatial
relations. Being may be said to manifest the macroworld within itself—after all,
the macroworld is manifested with the help of reflexive relations—rather than in
something other than itself.
6 Quantum nonlocality
For those interested in the fundamental structure of the physical world,
the experimental verification of violations of Bell’s inequality constitutes
the most significant event of the past half-century. In some way our basic
picture of space, time, and physical reality must change. These results, and
18 Some of its representatives in the Western hemisphere are the Neoplatonists, John Scottus
Eriugena, and the German idealists. The quintessential Eastern example is the original (pre-
illusionist) Vedanta of the Upanishads (Phillips, 1995; Sri Aurobindo, 2001, 2003).
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the mysteries they engender, should be the common property of all who
contemplate with wonder the universe we inhabit. (Maudlin, 2011, p. 4)
In his seminal paper of 1964, Bell showed that the principle of local causes (also
called Einstein locality) was incompatible with quantum mechanics—a result that
was hailed by Stapp (1975) as “the most profound discovery of science.” In his
famous cat paper, Schro¨dinger noted that “Measurements on separated systems
cannot directly influence each other—that would be magic.” Bell showed that the
magic was real. His conclusion was that
In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to de-
termine the results of individual measurements, without changing the sta-
tistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of one
measuring device can influence the reading of another instrument, however
remote. (Bell, 1964)
The reason Bell examined deterministic theories, in which unobservable parame-
ters are added to quantum mechanics, was not that he was averse to indeterminism
but that deterministic theories were the only hope for retaining locality, a hope
that was dashed by him for good. While in an indeterministic theory locality is
doomed by perfect correlations, in a deterministic theory it is doomed by Bell’s
inequality. No matter whether measurement outcomes are determined by hidden
parameters or stochastic, there must be a causal connection between the setting of
one apparatus and the reading of another, and if an inertial frame exists in which
the two events—the setting of the first apparatus and the reading of the second—
are simultaneous, the connection will be superluminal. It is then called “nonlocal”
because it can be accounted for neither by a direct influence propagating locally
from one event to the other nor by a common cause in the intersection of the past
light cones of the two events.
The causality associated with the atemporal process of manifestation presents
the nonlocality of quantum mechanics in a new light. I contend that quantum me-
chanics violates locality for the same reason that the manifestation of the world
cannot be explained by processes that connect events across spacetime, spacetime
being an aspect of the finished product, the manifested world. The atemporal pro-
cess by which Being enters into reflexive relations and matter and space come into
being as a result, is the nonlocal event par excellence. Depending on one’s point
of view, it is either coextensive with spacetime (i.e., completely delocalized) or
“outside” of spacetime (i.e., not localized at all). Occurring in an anterior relation
to space and time, it is the common cause of all correlations, not only of the seem-
ingly inexplicable ones between simultaneous events in different locations but also
of the seemingly explicable ones between successive events in the same location.
I also contend that the diachronic quantum correlations between events in
timelike relation are in reality as mysterious and inexplicable (in terms of across-
space-and-time causality) as the synchronic quantum correlations between events
in spacelike relation. The notion that the former can be explained causally, through
a dynamical evolution that connects outcomes of measurements made on the same
system at different times, is an illusion. This kind of evolution misrepresents the
dependence of probabilities on the times of the measurements to the outcomes
of which they are assigned. We know as little of a physical process by which an
event here and now contributes to determine the probability of a later event here
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as we know of a physical process by which an event here and now contributes to
determine the probability of a distant event now.
The nonlocality implied by Bell’s theorem and similar no-go theorems thus is
but the most salient symptom of a much deeper and more general nonlocality.
It is the nonlocality of that intrinsically undifferentiated Being, one with every
fundamental particle, which manifests the world by entering into (or entertaining)
reflexive spatial relations. It is the nonlocality of the process of manifestation,
which yields an apparent locality (i.e., amenability to local explanation) only in
its final outcome, the manifested world.
Quantum physics does not explain “how nature does it.” As Feynman (1985,
p. 78) put it, “[t]here are no ‘wheels and gears’ beneath this analysis of Nature.”
The theory only explains—via conservation laws—why certain things won’t hap-
pen. This is exactly what one would expect if the force that has set the stage
for the drama of an evolutionary unfolding of life19 and mind were an infinite
(unlimited) force operating under self-imposed constraints. In that case we would
have no reason to be surprised or dismayed by the impossibility of explaining
the quantum-mechanical correlation laws in terms of physical mechanisms. For it
would be self-contradictory to invoke a physical mechanism to explain the working
of an infinite force. What would need explaining is why this force works under the
particular constraints that it does. Where the efficient causality of the atempo-
ral process of manifestation fails, final causality takes over. As was suggested in
the Introduction, what is possible is to explain why the laws of physics have the
specific form that they do (Mohrhoff, 2002, 2009b, 2011).
7 Postscript: consciousness and Being
If quantum states are regarded as evolving physical states, and if their unitary
“dynamics” is taken to be their natural mode of evolution, then collapse and ob-
jectification appear to be preternatural interventions into the course of Nature,
as was pointed out in Section 2. Because the obvious possible perpetrator of such
interventions is the consciousness of the observer, von Neumann (1932) came to
argue that “we must always divide the world into two parts, the one being the
observed system, the other the observer.” But neither are quantum states evolv-
ing physical states, nor do measurement outcomes exist merely in the minds of
observers. A measurement outcome is as observer-independent as the change in
the value of any macroscopic position from which it can be inferred (regardless
of whether anyone is around to make the inference). Contrary to claims made by
Stapp (2011) and others, quantum mechanics can be understood without reference
to conscious observers—to the extent that it can be understood.
19 A hundred years ago it seemed obvious to many that life could not have emerged from
utterly lifeless matter, just as today it seems obvious to many that experience cannot have
emerged from utterly non-experiential matter. Yet today no one appears to seriously doubt that
life did emerge from utterly lifeless matter; the seemingly insuperable “hard problem of life”
simply dissolved. So why should it not be the same with the “hard problem of consciousness”
(Chalmers, 1995), a hundred years from now? As Strawson (2006) has pointed out, one cannot
draw such a parallel unless one considers life completely apart from conscious experience.
If consciousness is essential to life, as it may well be, one cannot reduce life to physics via
chemistry if one cannot reduce consciousness along with it.
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This does not mean that quantum mechanics cannot throw light on the mys-
terious presence of consciousness in what appears to be a material universe. To
my mind, what holds the key to this conundrum is the self-identical Being that
constitutes every particle in existence. The root of consciousness is not to be found
in the manifested world, nor in the process of manifestation, but in that which
manifests the world. For Being does not simply manifest the world; it manifests
the world to itself. Being relates to the world not only as the substance that con-
stitutes it but also as the consciousness that contains it. It is at once the single
substance by which the world exists, and the ultimate self or subject for which it
exists.
How, then, are our conscious selves related to this ultimate self or subject?
This question has been answered in considerable detail and on a solid experiential
foundation by the Indian philosopher (and freedom fighter, and mystic) Sri Au-
robindo (Heehs, 2008). In keeping with a more than millennium-long philosophical
tradition (Phillips, 1995), Sri Aurobindo (2005) posits an Ultimate Reality whose
intrinsic nature is (objectively speaking) infinite Quality and (subjectively speak-
ing) infinite Delight. This has the power to manifest its inherent Quality/Delight
in finite forms, and the closest description of this manifestation is that of an all-
powerful consciousness creating its own content.
In the native poise of this consciousness, its single self is coextensive with its
content and identical with the substance that constitutes the content. A first self-
modification of this supramental consciousness leads to a poise in which the one self
adopts a multitude of standpoints, localizing itself multiply within the content of
its consciousness and viewing the same in perspective. It is in this secondary poise
that the dichotomy between subject and object, or self and substance, becomes a
reality.
Probably the most adequate description of the process by which the one self
assumes a multitude of standpoints is that of a multiple concentration of conscious-
ness. A further self-modification of the original creative consciousness occurs when
this multiple concentration becomes exclusive. We all know the phenomenon of
exclusive concentration, when consciousness is focused on a single object or task,
while other goings-on are registered subconsciously, if at all. A similar phenomenon
transforms individuals who are conscious of their essential mutual identity into in-
dividuals who have lost sight of this identity and, as a consequence, have lost access
to the supramental view of things. Their consciousness is mental, which means not
only that it belongs to a separate individual but also that it perceives or presents
the world as a multitude of separate objects.
Kafatos (2014) recently expressed the view that “The main issue is not why
our universe is nonlocal and entangled but rather how it appears as being made
of distinct, physical objects.” According to him, the fundamental issue is how our
consciousness “takes on limited characteristics, divides the infinite and in the end
creates a limited, divided, physicalist view” of reality. That, indeed, is the question,
and the answer is: by a multiple exclusive concentration of the creative conscious-
ness that is one with Being. The belief that “things claim an existence independent
of one another” whenever they “lie in different parts of space” (Einstein, 1948)
gives expression to the mind’s way of dealing with reality, not to the supramen-
tal truth of things. I agree with Kafatos that consciousness “is primary, rather
than derived through blind processes as current materialist approaches claim.”
Consciousness is primary because Being is primary, and because at its origin con-
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sciousness is one with Being. But I do not see the quantum-mechanical phenomena
of coherence, entanglement, and nonlocality as (more or less direct) evidence that
“the universe . . . is basically living and conscious,” as Kafatos does. As I see it
(Mohrhoff, 2002, 2009b, 2011), the well-tested laws of physics (including the afore-
said phenomena) are largely consequences of the existence of “ordinary” objects
as defined in note 1. As long as the existence of such objects is taken for granted,
there is no reason to implicate consciousness. It is only when we address the purely
metaphysical question why such objects are composed of finite numbers of objects
lacking spatial extent that consciousness enters the picture.
Here is how. If one of the characteristics of mind is the ability to devise plans
for action and to generate ideas for creation, one of the characteristics of life is
the ability to carry out such plans and to execute such ideas. Mentally conscious
living beings come into existence not only by an evolution from seemingly lifeless
and unconscious matter but also, and in the first place, by a multiple exclusive
concentration of the creative consciousness that is one with Being. What happens
if this multiple exclusive concentration is carried to its logical conclusion? What
happens then is the coming into being of a world whose inhabitants lack not only
the ability to generate ideas but also the power to execute them. And since this
power is responsible for the existence of individual forms, the result is a world of
formless individuals, which we are used to calling “fundamental particles.” This
is how the original creative consciousness came to be “involved” in mind, how
mind came to be “involved” in life, and how life came to be “involved” in formless
particles. And that is why formless particles are capable of evolving life, why
life is capable of evolving mind, and why mind may eventually evolve into the
supramental consciousness, which is Being’s power of self-determination.
The action of this supramental consciousness is primarily qualitative and in-
finite and only secondarily quantitative and finite. Essentially, mind is the agent
of the supermind’s secondary, quantifying, and delimiting action. But when it is
separated in self-awareness from its supramental parent consciousness, as it is in
us, it not only divides ad infinitum but also takes the resulting multiplicity for the
original truth or fact. This is why we tend to construct reality from the bottom
up, on an intrinsically and completely differentiated space or space-time, out of
locally instantiated physical properties, or else by aggregation, out of a multitude
of individual substances. And that, at bottom, is why making sense of quantum
mechanics is so hard. For, as we found in Section 2, the spatial differentiation of
the physical world does not go “all the way down.” Reality is structured by a pro-
gressive self-differentiation of Being that does not “bottom out,” and this makes
it impossible to construct reality from the bottom up.
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